p r e c i s 
• Introduction W e live in a shrinking common world in which subscribers to Abrahamic monotheism are at odds with and often at war with one another-and with themselves. Much of today's social turmoil is grounded in past and present injustices and grievances, but there is much more to it than that. There is no simple explanation for our conflicts, but a small part of the problem is theological. Having a common understanding and acceptance of a true monotheism might help in some very small way.
Few if any academics have done as much to help Christians, Muslims, and Jews understand and accept one another as Miroslav Volf, who has argued forcefully and effectively for a common God of love and a common morality grounded in the two love commandments, which are so fundamental in every Abrahamic monotheism. In 2007, in A Common Word between Us and You, 1 hundreds of distinguished Muslims explicitly affirmed that love of God and neighbors is as fundamental in Islam as it is in Christianity and Judaism, while still insisting upon God's unity.
In explaining Christian affirmations of monotheism and God's unity, Volf addressed theological misinterpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity in his 2011 book, Allah: A Christian Response, 2 and in other publications.
This essay explains that and why his version of the Trinity will not persuade most Jews and Muslims that Christians do not worship three gods; then, it will explore alternative versions of the Trinity. Volf is right, of course, that a Christian account of the Trinity that is not tritheistic is highly desirable and that such is available in the long history of Christian thought. This essay reviews several traditional but genuinely monotheistic understandings of the Trinity, some of which may be acceptable to many if not most thoughtful Abrahamic monotheists. Granted, no theology will ever be acceptable to all. Today, many Christians think that Jews and Muslims do not believe in and worship the same God as their own-and that their own way is superior. Surprisingly, many Jews and Muslims agree that they do not worship the same God as Christians-and they think that their own way is superior. One significant hanging point is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Some Christians think that Jews and Muslims are idolaters because they do not believe in the Trinity, while many Jews and Muslims think that Christians are idolaters because they do believe in the Trinity. Jews and Muslims have insisted for centuries that the Trinity is sheer polytheism or tritheismverbally disguised as monotheism: "They do blaspheme who say: Allah is one of the three in the Trinity. There is no god except One God" (Qur'ān 5:73), and "The Lord your God is One" (Dt. 6:4). The latter was quoted as scripture by Jesus in Mk. 12:29. God is not three, Muslims and Jews insist, offshoot Unitarians, they would agree that an authentic monotheism is a nonnegotiable theological belief. Some Muslims actually apply the word "unitarian" to themselves, though not of the Christian-offshoot variety. 8 Few are likely to be convinced that Volf 's account of the Trinity avoids tritheism. Why not?
Most importantly, Volf explained, Christians believe "that the divine essence is undivided."
9 By "essence" he meant God's most essential and important properties, such as good, lover, knower, creator, eternity, etc., though he never defined this concept in the abstract. Most specifically, he had in mind God's eternal and unchanging being, goodness, and love. 10 The three "Persons" of the Trinity are really one, he explained, because they "are tied and intertwined together in a most intimate manner, more intimate than any relation between creatures could ever be." 11 This means that whatever God does and whatever God is applies equally to all persons of the Trinity. The three persons of the Trinity "mutually indwell." 12 This seems to mean that all have essentially the same basic properties or attributes.
Especially with respect to love, according to Volf, the distinction between having properties and being those properties is very important, but some Muslim thinkers disagree. According to Habib Ali al-Jifri, " [L] ove is an attribute of God Himself. God loves, but we cannot say according to Muslim belief that God is love, because love is an attribute. . . . The attributes of God are eternal, and they do not change with the changing states of people." 13 Does "God is love" say anything more than that "God loves"? What exactly? Volf 's answer is that the former describes what God is eternally in Godself, while the latter merely describes God in relation to something external. As he put it, "God is love says more . . . than only that God loves. It names the character of God's being, not merely the nature of God's activity toward the world."
14 Some theologians suggest that forgiveness could not be eternal in God because it requires existing sinners. Yet, God could still have an eternal capacity to forgive "before" any sinners exist. Most Christian and Islamic theologians think that all of the essential attributes of God (love, goodness, knowledge, etc.) belong to God's eternal, uncreated, inner, intrinsic essence, not merely to God's relations with externals such as sinners or the created world. Joseph I. Cumming concluded, "Muslims and Christians alike can affirm that God's love is not merely a temporal quality of act, but is eternal and uncreated in God." 15 Of course, the attributes of God's inner intrinsic essence could also relate extrinsically to external realities. Volf 's argument from love to three personalities in the Trinity requires internal loving relations of self-aware subjects toward other distinct objects or persons. So, with respect to love and all other essential divine properties, "being" versus "having" looks like a distinction without a difference. What is true of each that is not true of the others, despite their common essence? What are the distinctive differentiating elements of the three "persons"? Why three instead of only one? And, do these add up to tritheism, or not? Historically, the distinctive elements of the Trinity were conceived of in a variety of ways. Several trinitarian models of "threeness" will be explained in what follows.
The Social or Interpersonal Model of the Trinity
One way to understand the Trinity is very popular, not just with a relatively uninformed or conservative Christian populace, but also with many astute Christian scholarly minds such as Volf. Their idea is that the Trinity con-sists of three distinct self-aware centers of consciousness or "personalities," all possessing their own inner but coinciding psychological and other properties. Their "one God unity" is that all of the essential attributes of each divine self-aware subject are in perfect harmony with attributes of each of the other two, especially so with respect to their inner psychological properties. Yet, as distinct persons, each is a unique, self-aware, conscious subject.
Perhaps the harmonious "intertwining" of these three divine subjects could be understood as something like this. Each is present exactly where the others are present, and so on. Each is thus a unique and self-aware person, subject, or center of consciousness, but all have identical, essential, inner, universal, or repeatable properties, capacities, or attributes. All three know that their own immediate self-awareness is different from the direct selfawareness of the other two. These three Persons are three Personalities in our modern understanding of the term. Their collective "oneness" consists in the perfectly harmonious interpersonal coherence and intertwining of all the properties of their common inner essence. This means that whatever God does, and whatever God is, applies equally to all persons of the Trinity. 16 This could not quite be true, however. As John B. Cobb, Jr., pointed out, in the view of the early church, the Father and the Son "both were involved in all God's acts-except one: Only the Son or Logos was incarnate in Jesus."
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Volf has subscribed to the interpersonal, social, or "three distinct selfaware subjects" account of what counts as "three" in the Trinity, 18 though he has never explicitly used this expression. What evidence indicates that he has presupposed such a social or interpersonal model of the Trinity? After explaining that "authentic revelation has a trinitarian structure" and that "what is at stake in affirming the trinitarian nature of God is the reality of God's self-revelation," 19 Volf added:
The second thing is the matter of God's love. "God is love" (1 John 4:16) is one of the bedrock claims of the Christian faith. Not "God loves the creatures God has made," which is certainly true, but "God is love." But how is God to be love before there were any creatures to love? Only if, in God's own very being, God loves and is love. "The doctrine of the Trinity," writes Archbishop Williams in the text that Sheikh al-Jifri so highly praised, "is a way of explaining why we say that God is love, not only that he shows love." For love, you need more than the sovereign and solitary one, another point made eloquently by Nicholas of Cusa.
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Elsewhere, Volf explained, "God is an internally differentiated unity: there is 'other' in the One God. And because there is 'other' in God, there can be genuine love." 21 The question again is, other whats? Here being love internally requires having love for an "external" other. The logic of Volf 's argument from love to the reality of the Trinity as three distinct, self-aware, conscious subjects or "personalities" runs something like this: "Love implies, indeed requires, an object." 22 Actually, love necessarily requires both a subject and an object. But, what was the object of God's love during that time before time began-"before there were any creatures to love"? As required by his interpersonal or social model, Volf 's answer is that each "person" or self-aware conscious subject of the Trinity loved each of the others even "before" there was a created world to love. God's "self-love" consists primordially in each divine subject's loving and identifying psychologically, evaluationally, and completely with each of the other two. Volf finds the argument from love to the reality of the interpersonal or social Trinity in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century. Perhaps it had even deeper historical roots; it was clearly formulated in the twelfth century by Richard of St. Victor. It is now rather commonplace among prominent theologians such as Richard Swinburne, Jürgen Moltmann, John Zizioulas, Philip Clayton, Joseph A. Bracken, William Lane Craig, Volf, and many oth-ers, including those who gave Christian responses to A Common Word between Us and You. The argument from love to the Trinity assumes that divine love "before there were any creatures to love" could only be expressed toward other selfaware subjects in the Trinity. Yes, love does require a subject and a subjectobject, and "you need more than the sovereign and solitary one," but Volf did not consider the possibility, offered often and in detail by so many process theologians, that there never was such a state as "before there were any creatures to love." As Alfred North Whitehead put it, God "is not before all creation, but with all creation."
23 Process theologians affirm that God has been infinitely creative, so even before or beyond the creation of our own universe or "cosmic epoch," God has created infinitely many other universes and creatures to love. Most of today's "many worlds" astrophysicists also contend that infinitely many other universes exist in supertime "before our time" and/or in superspace "beyond our space." Process thinkers emphasize God's infinite creativity in supertime, the proverbial "time before (our) time began," so some world to love, though not ours, coexists eternally with an infinitely creative God. 24 Yes, love needs "more than the sovereign and solitary one," but there is more than one way to provide for such a "more." Volf 's trinitarian "Only if, in God's own very being, God loves and is love" is definitely not the only way to provide an infinite or everlasting "more" for God to love, despite Volf 's assumption to the contrary. The most serious problem with Volf 's position is that "three distinct selfaware subjects or centers of consciousness" who are co-eternal, knowing, loving, good, etc. , is precisely what serious monotheists and unitarians of every description regard as the epitome of tritheism. An authentic monotheism affirms more than that there is only one God; it also affirms that God is only one self-aware divine subject of love, goodness, etc. This was explained so clearly by William Ellery Channing in his sermon on "Unitarian Christianity": The Trinity as Ineffable, beyond All Human Concepts
Volf 's second response to the objection that Christian talk about God's Unity-despite-Trinity is mere double talk and mere tritheism in disguise is that the Trinity is beyond human comprehension. He affirmed, with so many others, that our human words and thoughts about God are inevitably inaccurate, perhaps totally in vain. No human concepts apply literally to God, including "one" and "three." In fact, none may apply at all, including those constituting our understanding of the Trinity. Finding ample precedent for divine ineffability in traditional Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa, Volf returned to this theme in his chapter on "The One God and the Holy Trinity." Here is the crux of his argument from mystery to the Trinity:
[O]ur difficulties in speaking of God would not go away if God were not the Holy Trinity. All words we use of God-such as "sustainer" and "master" or "gracious and "merciful" (Al Fatihah, 1:1-4)-are inadequate. Why? Augustine explains: "Because the total transcendence of the godhead quite surpasses the capacity of ordinary speech." The words paint a picture or tell a story, so to speak, but the picture or the story is always more dissimilar than it is similar to who God truly is. God is uncreated and infinite. Therefore God is inexpressible, beyond our concepts, beyond our language.
The talk of "Persons" captures something important about God, but is inadequate to express the full reality, because God transcends the notion of "person," as we have seen. The same is true of "essence," "goodness," "love"-all to varying degrees correct and true when referring to God, but all also deeply inadequate. The very reality of God is such that God always remains inconceivable, a mystery that can never be properly named or puzzled out. 30 Thus, "ineffability" fully applies to the Trinity. Volf explained that God is "Beyond Numbers," just as Nicholas of Cusa had indicated. Neither "one" nor "three" may mean anything whatsoever when applied to God! 31 So, where does that leave us? How far does Volf go with "God always remains inconceivable"? How far can any via negativa be pushed and still leave us with anything theological to think or believe at all? Here are some relevant considerations. First, if carried too far, "beyond all numbers" is not likely to be of any comfort at all to Jews, Muslims, Unitarians, or orthodox Christians who insist that God truly is in some intelligible sense "one." Second, this is not likely to be of any comfort whatsoever to those Christians who insist that God is in some meaningful sense "three" as well as "one." Despite divine ineffability, Volf and most theologians have actually attached some degree of intelligibility to human concepts that we apply to God-granted that they are never completely satisfactory. No doubt, there really is something to the traditional theological emphasis on God's unfathomable mystery and ultimate (to us) inconceivability. The problem is to find a balance somewhere between something worth knowing and not knowing anything at all. Consider Volf 's (and the tradition's) primary reason for affirming divine ineffability: God is uncreated and infinite. Therefore, God is inexpressible, beyond our concepts, beyond our language. In classical theology, the attribute of "simplicity" or "simple oneness" 32 dissolved all that we know and think about God (including threeness) into an undifferentiated unity of Parmenidean pure being. Volf instead interpreted "simplicity" to mean only that God is rather than has God's attributes, 33 which is another matter altogether, as already explained. The argument from ineffability to the Trinity assumes that we understand a few "God-talk" words perfectly well, and, "therefore," in light of these, all other human concepts fail when applied to God. Pure being, unity, simplicity, infinity, etc.-all were presumed to be well-understood concepts, perhaps somehow even divine and not "merely human." "Infinite" or "boundless," which Volf found in Nicholas of Cusa, 34 is the primary culprit.
Like "simplicity," "infinity" makes God and all of God's other attributes radically unlike everything else we know, conceive, or experience. This includes humanly understood goodness, love, justice, knowledge, powers, creativity, values, decisions, feelings, unity, plurality, etc. Most theologians suppose that humanly understood qualities can at best be attributed only analogically to an infinite being. Volf, through Nicholas of Cusa, seems to have taken this one step further; perhaps they cannot be attributed to God at all, but then he backed away. About God's unknowability-as-infinite, we must ask why human concepts such as "simplicity" and "infinity" have a specially privileged cognitive status, while other human words such as "love" and "knowledge" do not. As Charles Hartshorne pointed out long ago, "If [God] escapes all the resources of our language and analysis, why be so insistent upon the obviously quite human concepts, absolute, infinite, perfect, immutable? These too are our conceptions, our terms, fragments of the English or Latin languages."
35 These, too, can have only analogical or indefinite theological meanings, at best, if we take God's mystery seriously. In the via negativa, the "way of negation," God is said to be "not this, and not that," and maybe not anything at all. The logical "not" is assumed to apply literally to our thoughts about God. However, "not," too, like "infinite," is a merely human concept. Does "not" have analogical or metaphorical meanings? The inadequacy of our knowledge of God cannot rest upon the assumption that some human concepts are literal, privileged, and superhuman, while others are merely human and metaphorical. Perhaps we have a significant degree of understanding of some human concepts applied to God, although none are specially privileged. The mystery of God is that all of our concepts fall short, not simply that a few do because a few do not. The meaningfulness of God as a "person" in the Trinity depends upon the intelligibility to us of "personal" attributes applied to God. "One" and "three," even when applied nonliterally, must make some sense to us, if only as mathematical metaphors. Volf occasionally suggests that revelation makes words or concepts meaningful that are otherwise humanly meaningless, 36 but exactly what do revealed theologians comprehend that merely human theologians do not? Revelation is usually said to give truth, not to clarify meanings. Maybe we can do better than that. By degrees that cut across "revealed versus rational truth" lines, there may be a real sense in which we can understand some of the words or concepts we use to describe God, if only by degrees. Perhaps, as Hartshorne maintained, all of God's "attributes," including "infinite," "good," "loving all," "knowing all," "present to all," etc., are meaningful enough to us in the abstract, though completely beyond our comprehension in the concrete. 37 Human beings simply cannot assimilate all the concrete details embraced by the "omni" attributes, though we grasp "all" well enough abstractly as a logical quantifier. We can understand in the abstract that God "knows" and "loves" all, but the specifics of all of what and how God knows and loves infinitely are beyond our human grasp. Perceiving, imaging, and having enough words for the actualities of such richness of being and becoming-and of what it would be like concretely to have God's "omni" capabilities-are totally beyond our human capacities for assimilation. Perhaps, as theologians such as Philip Clayton have suggested, God is "trans-personal" or "more-than-personal."
38 This means that our concepts are not less than "personal" when applied to God, even though they are incomprehensibly more than that. Volf found Nicholas of Cusa to say, "God infinitely excels and precedes all such names," including those that describe the Trinity. 39 At best, all of our theological concepts may be in some sense "analogical" or "metaphorical," including our notions of "infinite, "not," "one," and "three." Theological humility and fallibilism, rather than either dogmatic infallibilism or absolute relativism, always behoove us. We have no excuse for sloppy theological thinking, but our best is never quite good enough. Concerning ultimate reality and the whole of it, mystery always remains, but is the mystery absolute? As a professional philosopher, I am convinced that we should be as rational as possible about everything, including our understanding of God, while acknowledging our inescapable human and personal limitations. Neither revelation nor reason will deliver us completely from the mysteries of God-and all else. Having spent most of my life philosophizing, I am convinced that reason is not sufficiently powerful to bring about complete intersubjective agreement among all rationally competent authorities. The same is true of revelation and of all competent revealed religion authorities. Intersubjective agreement about everything has always been, and probably will always be, an unfulfilled but noble ideal, whether applied either to reason or to revelation. Both are deeply grounded in value diversities, as well as in cultures and personal uniqueness. I must agree with Volf that "it is evident that there is no such thing as common or 'generically human' reason, certainly not when it comes to the nature of human beings, to relations between them, and to questions of morality and the purposes of human life. Everybody is part of a specific tradition of reasoning, not just religious people." 40 To his list of issues, I would add the mystery of God and of all of reality, and I am confident that he would not disagree.
The Substance/Person Model
The substance/person model is the orthodox or "official" Christian model of the Trinity, but it always was, and still is, susceptible to many different interpretations. The early church passed through several centuries of uncertainty, puzzlement, heated debates, and compromises before it partly formulated this model at the Council of Nicea in 325 c.e. This first ecumenical council, composed of around 300 Christian bishops, was initiated by the superficially Christian Roman Emperor, Constantine. He wanted to make Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire, but he was greatly disturbed by constant Christian bickering over fundamental doctrines. His most serious concerns were political, not theological. He did not much care what the Council concluded, as long as they concluded something; he primarily wanted definitive results and Christian theological unity for the sake of political unity and hegemony. How did the doctrine of the Trinity come about historically? From the outset, everyone recognized that the word "Trinity" was not used in the Christian Scriptures. Yes, "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit" were named there, but there was no explanation of what they are, how they differ, or how they are related to or united with one another ontologically. For at least 400 years, no one in the early church knew how to explain or conceive of such matters, but there was much frenzied controversy. In 325 c.e., the Council of Nicea made some progress, but it focused on the relation of Christ and God and neglected the Holy Spirit. It concluded that Christ and God are one in "substance" (homoousios), though otherwise different. After centuries more of controversy, a formula for the Trinity, "three persons with a common or shared substance," emerged as orthodoxy. Tertullian first advanced the "una substantia tres personae" wording even before the Council of Nicea. 41 Tertullian and other early church thinkers probably attached vague, multiple, and equivocal meanings to the words in this formula, which has changed little with time. After many more debates, excommunications, exiles, and violent clashes, such wording became the orthodox formula after the Council of Constantinople in 381 c.e., but perplexities remained and still do. In many ways, the meaning of "three persons, one substance" is very unclear. It looks like the work of a committee commissioned to reconcile irreconcilables. Exactly what counts as a "person" was and still is much debated. Is each "person" a distinct "personality" or self-aware center of consciousness, having its own individual psychological and other properties that are duplicated exactly in each of the others? Or, does "person" mean something else altogether? It definitely may and often did mean something else entirely, as will be explained below.
What did "one substance," or its Greek counterpart "homoousios" mean? Obviously, this is not a biblical concept but is Greek in origin. The original orthodox formula for the Trinity was couched entirely in Greek philosophical or cultural language, not biblical language. There are no static Greek substances in biblical religion, and God is not called a "person" anywhere in the Bible. Early Christian thinkers were not very clear about the meaning of "substance." Sometimes they meant what is collectively common to the persons of the Trinity (their essence) and sometimes what is not common (their uniqueness). Sometimes "homoousios" connoted Aristotle's "essence" or "nature"-anything's most essential, enduring, and defining qualities. Volf's undivided divine essence common to three divine self-aware and other-loving subjects reflects this understanding. However, a common essence (such as humanity or divinity) does not account for each person's separateness and uniqueness. So, again, why three?
Sharing a common essence or nature does not individuate on the divine level any more than on the human level. It does not yield "three." Essences are composed entirely of universals or repeatable qualities and relations, not of individuals. So why three, yet only one? A second and more Aristotelian sense of "substance" is required for individuation, yet even that does not account for plurality, since the formula identifies only one substance, not three. Aristotle understood "ousios" or "substance" to be the concrete individual existence to which all properties or attributes belong, including those most essential. Substance in this sense is the self-sufficient and enduring concrete individual entity that underlies and supports all essential and accidental qualities and relations. Substance, thus understood, accounts for the collective unity of God in the orthodox formula, but, since there is only one substance, it does not account for the uniqueness and distinctiveness of each of the three persons. "Persons" is supposed to make a place somehow for the plurality of three, no matter which model is employed, but the orthodox formula declares "substance" to be only one. Neither a common essence nor one substance explains why there are three.
Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers and theologians have found the concept of "substance" to be very troublesome. It has no direct empirical meaning or reference. John Locke characterized "substance" as "that supposed something I know not what" that supports and possesses all the empirical or observable qualities and relations of experienced entities. Applied to the Trinity, this leaves us with the unity of God grounded in "a supposed something I know not what"-ineffability, indeed! Like "Trinity" and "substance," the orthodox word for the plurality of God, "personae," is also never applied to God in the Bible, as almost everyone acknowledged from the very outset. Like "homoousios," the word "personae" is of Greek origins, not Hebrew, Aramaic, or otherwise biblical. Its meaning derives from the masks worn by the actors in Greek plays or dramas, where the same actors often played more than one role or character and held a different mask in front of their faces to indicate which role they were playing. This points toward "three functions or roles" of one God as the proper original meaning for "person," rather than toward God as "three interpersonal self-aware personalities or centers of consciousness." Just as one human actor playing three roles has or is only one center of consciousness, so it is also with God, says the functional model of the Trinity. Neither the functional nor the psychological models are inherently tritheistic in their purest forms.
Psychological Models
Volf was right about one important thing. Genuinely monotheistic models of the Trinity have a prominent place in the long history and tradition of Christian thought. Regrettably, his tritheistic social or interpersonal model is not one of them. Nevertheless, genuinely monotheistic models are there somewhere within scripture, reason, tradition, and religious experience. Both psychological and functional models of the Trinity involve truly monotheistic or unitarian understandings of God, unless they are surreptitiously combined with the social, interpersonal, "three self-aware centers of consciousness" model. Historically, nonsocial models of the Trinity may have been fused occasionally with the interpersonal or social model in logically unstable ways, but not necessarily so. All are logically independent models.
Consider, now, a brief review of some nonsocial models of the Trinity in their purest unitarian or monotheistic modes. Psychological models of the Trinity identify the three "persons," Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, with three of God's psychological "faculties" or capacities. It seems that almost any three will do. Each version of this model requires only one supreme selfaware divine subject who manifests at least three psychological capacities. Each in pure form is thoroughly monotheistic or unitarian. Consider some examples from eminent orthodox Christian thinkers who were definitely not heretics.
According to Welch, the psychological model, not the tritheistic social or interpersonal model, dominated Christian theology all the way through the Middle Ages. "In short, while God was spoken of as tres personae, just because persona did not mean what is meant by the modern term 'personality,' Christianity (at least as represented by the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition) cannot be said to have been committed to a doctrine of personalities 50 but not necessarily so. This is a logically independent and authentically monotheistic model of the Trinity. The psychological analogy in its purest form clearly avoids tritheism, but it has its own problems. The main one is: Why only three? Why not one, two, four, five, or ten? All models of the Trinity have this problem, including the social: Why only three divine self-aware centers of consciousness? Is there something inherently sacred or extra special about the number "three," or is this just an accident of culture and history? Cobb asked, "What is lacking in a unitarian position? Would a binity or a quaternity do as well?" 51 If we total up the distinct psychological properties mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we get five-memory, understanding, will, love, and feeling. (Power is not clearly psychological, though there are psychological powers. Other wordings above duplicate these five.) Other possible inner "faculties" might be choice, agency, valuation, etc., which only scratch the surface. Al-Ghazali, the greatly respected medieval Muslim scholar, wrote a book titled The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God 52 in which he explicated the ninety-nine names ascribed to God in the Qur'ān. God also has many basic properties that are not inherently "psychological" in nature. 
Functional or Economic Models
Purely functional or "economic" models identify the Trinity with three fundamental ways in which God relates to the world or to its creatures. All are genuinely monotheistic as such; none require three unique self-aware centers of divine consciousness (tritheism). Also, they do not refer to anything inherent in the inner nature or essence of God. In pure form, they simply describe three different ways in which One God (one divine self-aware subject) relates "externally" to us and other creatures. Combined with a social model, each of the three functions of God may be assigned to a different "personality" in the Trinity-tritheism again. The most familiar and commonplace version of the functional model associates the Father, Son, and Spirit with "God as Creator and Sustainer, as the Redeemer in Christ, and as Sanctifier in the experience of the Holy Spirit." 53 Here, in its purest form, only one divine "personality"
relates to the created world and its creatures in these three basic ways. Standing alone, the functional model is authentically monotheistic. The functional or economic understanding of the "persons" of the Trinity may be one of the earliest. It most closely reflects the derivation of "persons" from the Greek "personae." It identifies three main roles that One God plays in relating to the world. Again, why only three? Why, for example, is "Preserver" not a fourth function in addition to "Creator"? Why is Jesus not an Example and a Teacher, as well as a Redeemer? Why is the Holy Spirit not a Comforter, a Constant Presence, or a Counselor, in addition to being a Sanctifier? If we must choose only three, which three? Why just these three, and why only three?
Multiple additional models and subtle modifications of the Trinity, some philosophical, are inherent within the deep history of Western thought. Briefly, Hegel identified the Father, Son, and Spirit of God with reality as a whole, all the rich parts of reality, and the self-conscious union of the whole and the parts. A Whiteheadian might identify the Trinity with the primordial, consequent, and superjective natures of God, but process theologians actually offer many ways of dividing up God's nature into partsand not always exactly three. 54 These and innumerable other possibilities are beyond the scope of this discussion, but perhaps this is enough for now. Unlike the social model, the psychological and functional models are all completely compatible with a truly monotheistic or unitarian understanding of God as only one divine self-aware subject. All properties ascribed to God in these two models are important and perfectly legitimate, and they have deep roots in the history of Christian thought. Yet, none of them require only or at most three. Christians can definitely be monotheists, but must they be trinitarians?
God, Mystery, Love, and Humility
When all is said and done, we must agree that the Trinity is a great mystery. Though even this presupposes additional unstated premises, Volf 's implicit argument from mystery to the Trinity seems to be that God is a great mystery, so we should accept the incomprehensible Trinity. Yet, there is a counter-argument from mystery that counts against the Trinity, which runs like this: God is a great mystery, so how could anyone be so picky about "three"? How could God be so picky? Orthodoxy might say that "three" has been revealed, but other divine revelations say only "one." In some mysterious yet somehow intelligible way, could both be right, and could we somehow partly comprehend this, as this essay proposes?
To carry this forward a bit, because love, negations, and exact numbers are admittedly mysterious when applied to God, is it not much more important theologically and spiritually that God is loving than that God is precisely three, or even that God is unequivocally one? Systemically, we can only approach God with fuzzy logic, intellectual modesty, and conceptual humility. If adherents of the major monotheisms of the world, especially those within the Abrahamic tradition, could at least agree that God is unfathomable love and that God loves every creature that God has made with depths of love that we cannot fully comprehend, would the Trinity really matter all that much? Could the world's monotheists agree, as Volf and other Christian and Muslim responders to A Common Word between Us and You repeatedly affirm, 55 that a loving God would ask for our wholehearted or whole-personed love and that we should love everyone and everything that God loves, including but not limited to our own kin, kind, place, persuasion, or ourselves-and that we should behave accordingly? If we actually did this, would that not be spiritual salvation? While emphasizing union-under-God-with-love, all monotheists would still prefer to have an absolutely true, clear, and accurate understanding of "God," but the mystery of God says that this is exactly what no one can have. The mystery of God requires us to love God and one another without absolute clarity, assurance, certainty, or dogmatism. Love requires that there be no compulsion in religion, as the Qur'ān says. God's love for all in all, analogically understood, may be quite enough for Abrahamic and other monotheists to live, think, and work together for the common good with mutual affection and respect and to value one another intrinsically, empathetically, and compassionately in everyone's full cultural definiteness, common human dignity, and radical uniqueness, despite all unresolved differences. This applies just as much within as between religions. God seems to value degrees of both diversity and uniformity without an excess of either. Could we monotheists learn to rejoice and delight in our differences, as God apparently does? As Rodney King asked in another context, "Can we all get along?"
Identification Spirituality and the Union of Jesus and God
Along with most Christian theologians, Volf has insisted that the Trinity is absolutely essential for understanding the Christian doctrine of God's incarnation in Jesus, that is, how Jesus was one with God, as proclaimed in Jn. 10:30. As he explained, "Take away the trinitarian nature of God, and the 55 See A Common Word between Us and You, Christian belief about Christ as the incarnation of God collapses, and, with it, the whole Christian faith." 56 Of course, he had in mind his own version of the social or interpersonal model of the Trinity. Yet, the whole of Christian faith definitely will not collapse without that, because, as we now know, other authentically monotheistic models of the Trinity have a venerable place in Christian tradition and thought. From the outset we should recognize that "mystery" applies just as much to the union of Jesus and God as it does to our understanding of the attributes and nature of God. The most serious problem about "I and the father are one" is that there are many ways in which two or more things can be "one." Closely related, as Volf indicated, even "one" can have metaphorical, nonliteral, and downright mysterious meanings. "One" may indicate or include both resemblances and differences rather than perfect identity. Two or more distinct people can be of one mind, one heart, one soul, one team, one body of Christ, etc., without being perfectly identical in all respects. Husband and wife become "one flesh" in marriage. God and the mystic become one pure consciousness in mystical ecstasy, according to some mystics. All phenomenal egos might belong to one underlying noumenal ego, as Kant suggested. All could be manifestations or appearances of one underlying Brahma, as some Hindus believe. The Gospel of John does not explain how Jesus and God were one, so every explanation is a fallible or "merely human" interpretation. Christian traditions offer diverse accounts of how this works.
Another problem is that, since the Council of Chalcedon in 451 c.e., Christian orthodoxy does not proclaim simply, "Jesus was God." Rather, it proclaims that Jesus was both fully human and fully divine, so being one with God in John's Gospel could not mean complete identity. Unlike the other three Gospels, the fourth has Jesus say, "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (Jn. 14:9), and "I and the Father are one" (Jn. 10:30). It also has him say, "The Father is greater than I" (Jn. 14:28), and it portrays Jesus as praying to God, not to himself (Jn. 11:41-41). Fathers and sons can fully identify with one another in love without being ontologically identical. Jesus clearly believed in only one God who was other than himself. So, even in John's Gospel, "one" clearly does not connote perfect identity. Relevant also is Lk. 18:19, wherein Jesus asked, "Why do you call me good?" and an-swered, "There is none good except God alone." Maybe Jesus himself did not claim to be absolutely perfect and divine. That this text survived all the doctrinal winnowing is quite amazing.
Just how the Jesus of history could be "one" with God, yet possess "two natures," both divine and human, has always been a great puzzle-if not an incomprehensible paradox. Yet, for Christian orthodoxy, losing track of either the human or the divine in Jesus is heresy. Jesus was God without ceasing to be fully human, and God was Jesus without ceasing to be God. How could this be? What could this mean? For millennia, Christians have tried to figure this out.
Explained next is a proposal about how this might work in a thoroughly monotheistic theology-without the tritheism of three mutually loving but distinct self-aware divine subjects with overlapping or intertwined properties. No understanding of Jesus will solve all problems or satisfy everyone, but please consider the following "identification spirituality" account of how Jesus and God were one. Written from a Christian perspective, it may seem exaggerated to some non-Christians and to scholars who question the "perfection" of Jesus.
57 Portraits of Jesus tend to be idealistic, but the following seems to capture his dominant values and spiritual sensitivities. We will never eliminate all the mystery, but occasionally we can push back the darkness ever so slightly. What sense can we make of the claims that, in Jesus, God and humanity are one, and Jesus and God are one? How so? As indicated, two separate and distinct things can be "one" in many different ways, so, when Jesus said, "I and the Father are one," might this mean something that many if not most Christians, Jews, and Muslims could accept? Christian orthodoxy insists that Jesus was one with God without ceas- Blanshard found excessive vengefulness in Jesus' threats to those who will not help the poor and needy or accept his messages (as in Mt. 25:41 and 46; , and he suggested that Jesus did not adequately respect the property rights of others when he drowned the Gadarene swine (Mt. 8:28-34) and when he ordered his disciples to appropriate someone's colt in a nearby village (Mt. 21:2). What happened to the pigs that belonged to someone else was also cruel to and bad for them; they had done nothing to deserve their fate. Even if Jesus was not absolutely perfect in every conceivable respect, he approximated moral and spiritual identification with God far more than most of the rest of us do.
ing to be a human being, without ceasing to be the unique, concrete, finite, temporal, human person that he was; and he continues to be fully God and fully human even now as he "sits at the right hand of God" (metaphorically speaking). Correspondingly, God was one with the finite human Jesus without ceasing to be God, the infinite, everlasting, creator, sustainer, and ruler of the universe, the all-inclusive reality in whom we live and move and have our being. How could this be?
We will never have completely adequate answers. We will always disagree about many things, and we will always envision such things only in part, dimly, mythically, metaphorically, figuratively, poetically, nonliterally, as through a murky glass. However, the psychological concept of "identification," much emphasized by psychoanalysts 58 (though with too little attention to its moral and spiritual significance), may help to resolve this paradox and shed a little light. Without being the whole story, "fully God and fully human" may mean that Jesus fully identified with God, while God fully identified with Jesus. Many Christians might claim that perfect identification with God was true only of Jesus, but not of the central figures or founders of other religions. Some non-Christians may doubt that this was true even of Jesus. This is actually another open question, worthy of further interfaith discussion. As those of other faiths consider what follows, they might ask whether something like this could be true of their own founders and saints.
The meaning of being "fully identified with God" requires further explanation. When two humans fully and mutually identify with one another, they do not cease to exist as ontologically distinct and definite individuals, even though experientially and evaluationally they lose their spiritual, evaluational, moral, and psychological distinctness. They continue to be who they are, while also being or becoming one with others in heart, soul, mind, strength, and spirit. Their ontological differences are still very real, but they no longer matter and may not even be noticed. In identification experiences, what happens to others happens to oneself, for better or for worse. Identifiers think, feel, and act toward others as toward themselves. In identification experiences, souls merge, intertwine, and mutually indwell. They become "members of one another." In spiritual-union-in-identification experiences, they discover their own deepest personal and social reality and fulfillment. They find their own truest and deepest selves in moral and spiritual union and solidarity with others. Their existential differences still exist intact, but these no longer matter or make much difference spiritually, mentally, evaluationally, morally, psychologically, or practically. Ego is lost in intense concentration on and absorption into the other, and no sense or thought of self remains.
Christians believe that Jesus was born of the flesh and born of the spirit, while the rest of us are born of the flesh and require rebirth into the spirit. Perhaps this means that Jesus, fully a human, was so sensitive and open to God's presence and purposes that he totally and constantly identified himself with God, who he still called "greater than I." Perhaps he identified with God while praying to, thinking about, speaking the words of, absorbing the values of, and doing the works of God. Perhaps Jesus identified so fully with God that his thoughts, values, words, feelings, and works were God's thoughts, values, words, feelings, and works (usually? always?) . His compassion was God's compassion. His suffering was God's suffering. His love was God's love. His choices were God's choices. His deeds were God's deeds. These were all God's, yet they were also fully his-fully divine, yet fully human. We mere mortals can grasp or comprehend this mutual identification between God and Jesus better from the human perspective than from the divine side, but God also fully identified with Jesus, just as a loving human father identifies with his son or daughter-but infinitely more so.
Christians believe, at least implicitly, that Jesus internalized God by receiving God into himself, by recognizing without hindrance God's presence within himself and all of creation-experientially, psychologically, evaluationally, morally, and spiritually. No magic was involved, only complete interpersonal identification. Jesus wanted and endeavored to be Godlike, and Christians believe that he succeeded. In succeeding as a human being, he showed us what God is like and what God wants us to be like. In him, we can see God. He was Love and Word incarnate through mutual identificationboth Jesus with God and God with Jesus. In praying to God and acknowledging that God "is greater than I," he recognized that he and God were both alike and different, both one and many, but the differences did not matter given his complete and overwhelming intrinsic bonding and spiritual union with, sensitivity to, absorption in, moral harmony with, and intense psychological identification with God. Jesus valued God intrinsically, for God's own sake. God valued Jesus intrinsically, for Jesus' own sake. Through moral and spiritual identification, God became an integral part of Jesus' own unique personal reality, identity, values, ideals, expectations, experiences, intrinsic goodness, and common humanity. Through God's moral and spiritual identification with Jesus, Jesus became an integral part of God's own unique personal reality, identity, values, ideals, expectations, experiences, intrinsic goodness, and divinity.
Jesus was and lived what God expects of us; he lost or emptied himself (his constricted, self-centered, selfish, worldly, and merely human ego) and thereby found himself (his incalculably more inclusive moral-spiritualidentification-with-Godself). Psychologically, evaluationally, morally, behaviorally, and spiritually, God was an integral aspect of his own total human personal identity. As one with God through moral, spiritual, and personal identification, Jesus made all things holy by intrinsically valuing and identifying himself with everything (except evil) in every value dimension, that is, by identifying himself in his full humanity and individuality with all systemically, extrinsically, and intrinsically valuable realities in all of creation (at least, all that was humanly possible). He identified with all goodness, but he also took all the sin, suffering, and woe of the created world into himself and compassionately suffered them with and for us. Most if not all major world religions highly commend profound empathy, compassion, and their formal expression in the "Golden Rule."
In God, and as fully identified with God, Jesus loved wisdom, the world, goodness, and all of us, all of creation. In Jesus, and as fully identified with Jesus, God loved wisdom, the world, goodness, and all of us. We may at least speculate that, for Jesus, intrinsic identification experience was almost constant, everyone and everything was sacred; and God was experienced as all in all, as present in all. His spiritual union with God was almost uninterrupted-as much as humanly possible-except perhaps at the last, on the cross, when he felt God-forsaken.
When mere mortals approach Christlikeness or Godlikeness, they approximate such complete spiritual identification with God and, through God, with all in all. Christians find a route to this through Jesus. Others find other roads, good roads, to God. God is not an exclusivist, because God loves every creature that God has made (both human and nonhuman). Just as Jesus imitated and identified with God, Christians strive both to imitate and to identify with Jesus-so much so that they can say meaningfully with St. Paul, "Not I, but Christ within me" (1 Cor. 15:45; Gal. 2:20) . Muslims strive to imitate Muhammad, just as Christians strive to imitate Jesus. Nancy Roberts, who regards herself as a Muslim Christian, explained convincingly and in depth that the imitation of Christ and the imitation of Muhammad both have the same end-the imitation of God.
59 After comparing Jesus and Muhammad with respect to such things as combativeness, forgiveness, kindness, and beauty, Roberts concluded, "Jesus Christ remains the more perfect exemplar, the more perfect guide to the imitatio Dei."
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Of course, not all will agree, but in love we can agree to disagree. Not all Christians are pacifists. Cobb pointed out that Mohammed, Moses, and David were military and political leaders who engaged in some violence and did not conform strictly to the pattern of nonviolent resistance usually exemplified by Jesus (except with the moneychangers in the temple). He suggested that, for some people, "a teaching and example that can actually guide behavior on the world stage may be seen as superior to one that is applicable only in limited contexts. For this reason, despite the great reverence in which Muslims hold Jesus, Mohammed is seen as standing above or beyond him as the supreme prophet."
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Jesus fully identified with all of God's children, as well as with God-so much so that he could say almost literally of the poor and needy that "inasmuch as ye have done it (given help, relief, etc.) unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," and with the dire admonition, "Inasmuch as ye did it not [give help and relief] to one of the least of these, ye did it not unto me" (Mt. 25:45) . Jesus made no distinction between insiders and outsiders (such as the Samaritans), though he had to learn this from a Samaritan woman. Most Christians live by such distinctions, especially those who relate to Muslims and Jews as outsiders, strangers, aliens. Christians must constantly ask themselves if they are that sensitive and responsive to the poor and to the needs, aspirations, and intrinsic worth of everyone. Do Christians really do unto others as they would be done unto? Are Christians that Christlike? Most Christians are Christlike or Godlike only intermittently and by degrees, but totally inclusive moral and spiritual identification, both with God and with the poor and "least of these," is an ultimate goal of ongoing sanctification or spiritual development. Note that al-Jifri called it "spiritual ascension." 62 All monotheists recognize the importance of constant moral and spiritual growth. "Sanctification" is a common Christian word for this. Ideally, growth in identification spirituality culminates in complete awareness of and complete psychological/evaluational identification with all good-making properties of everyone and everything, everywhere and always. Abundant living consists precisely in including all positive value everywhere within oneself through identification with it, thereby becoming a profoundly transformed self, a more Godlike self. This inclusive internalization of external goodness is not restricted to moral goodness, though that is a significant part of it. Ideally, we should endorse, affirm, identify with, and rejoice in every desirable moral and nonmoral trait or property of everyone and everything-including persons of other faiths. Thereby, all goodness can become our own goodness in an unselfish way that rejoices in goodness for others, not in goodness exclusively for oneself. Thereby, our lives can attain maximal richness or abundance. Thereby, we rejoice empathetically with all who rejoice, while weeping compassionately-at least internally or metaphorically-with all who weep. And, we do something about it: We bear one another's burdens.
In practice and in our finitude, we actually know and identify ourselves intimately with the goodness in and of a mere handful of others, but we can at least cultivate the spiritual disposition to identify ourselves with all goodness in all and for the sake of all. God is indeed all in all and present in all, and God loves every creature that God has made for their sakes as well as for God's own sake, but in our finitude we will never be God (or Christ, or Muhammad, or Moses). Through growth in grace and spiritual identification, we can participate ever so slightly in supreme goodness in our own unique cultural, human, and individual ways. Persons of all monotheistic faiths may aspire to such abundant living and identification-union and solidarity with God and others, though all must answer for themselves.
Identification spiritualists in all times and places endeavor to identify with and include within themselves all the good-making properties of the founders, sages, and saints of the great historical religions. Christians identify most specifically with Jesus and his disciples; Muslims, with Muhammad and his successors; Jews, with Abraham, Moses, David, etc. Saints of all faiths identify with the goodness of all in all and respond forgivingly, compassionately, and correctively to the badness of all in all.
As Volf indicated, Christians distinctively insist that Jesus' death on the cross "takes away the sin of the world."
63 Technically, this is called "atonement." We cannot explore this in depth here, but there are many theories of atonement-the substitution theory, the ransom theory, the moral example or influence theory, and many others. No one of them counts as orthodoxy or is universally accepted as precisely the correct and only account of how Jesus "takes away the sins of the world." Identification spirituality offers another understanding of how Jesus redeems vicariously and how the saints can participate vicariously in that redemption. Through Jesus (the Suffering Servant, God's metaphorical Son), God so loved the world and took the sins, failures, and sufferings of the world upon and into Godself-as and while Jesus himself did so. God internalized and fully identified with Jesus from beginning to end, even on the cross. God suffered with Jesus. God forgives sinners, as Jesus forgave those who crucified him. Through identification with others, Jesus took human suffering and wickedness upon and into himself as he identified intensely, empathetically, compassionately, forgivingly, and responsively with everyone's pain, loss, poverty, social inferiority, and sinfulness. In his own identification experience with others, all such things really were "done unto him." Jesus wept and agonized over such things, as does the Christian God-as would any God of love. God wept as Jesus wept.
Like God and Jesus, Christian saints (all saints everywhere?) forgive, bear burdens, and carry crosses (metaphorically speaking). They live abundantly, but they also suffer and make sacrifices. They put people over systemic formalities (for example, doctrinal, legalistic, and ceremonial "purity"), just as Jesus did. Saints forgive, as Jesus forgave, and as God forgives. Saints have the right beliefs and do the right thing for the right rea-sons, just as Jesus did, but they acknowledge their own fallibility and allow others to live and let live and to think and believe for themselves. They take care of the poor and needy, just as Jesus did. They do unto others as they would be done unto, as Jesus did. Saints have the right motives, desires, affections, dispositions, and deeds, as Jesus did. Saints identify positively and intensely with all excellences everywhere, and they suffer with and from all evils everywhere, as Jesus did. In such ways, Jesus had it all. He excelled in all value dimensions-so Christians believe. Can this be said of other spiritual "avatars"? This genuinely open question invites further consideration.
As far as humanly possible, and by degrees, nonsaints (most religious people) also take the goodness, righteousness, excellences, shortcomings, and sufferings of others into and upon themselves when they identify intrinsically with them. "Bearing our sins, griefs, and sorrows," together with "vicarious goodness or righteousness," makes very good sense in identification spirituality. Jesus did it and had it. Like Jesus, their foremost example, Christian saints become suffering servants who forgive and bear burdens and crosses, their own and others'. They walk in his steps-all the way to the cross if necessary. Just as Jesus fully identified himself with God, who fully identified with Jesus, Christians strive to identify themselves as fully as possible with Jesus and his goodness and, through him, with God as present in and to all-including all who sin, all who suffer, all who believe and worship otherwise, and all who flourish, excel, and rejoice. Ideally, they live and act accordingly. For Christians, having the heart, soul, mind, and strength of Christ means identifying fully with him and, through him, with God-and through God with all in all. The sinlessness of Jesus becomes their sinlessness through identification. Muslim saints relate in similar ways to "the Prophet Muhammad's complete and utter devotion to God" 64 as their example for holy loving and living. By degrees, the saints succeed. By degrees, even the greatest human saints also fail. Loving someone means fully identifying with that one without losing one's own personal identity. Christians believe that Jesus was love incarnate, both human and divine. Some theologians may object to "psychologizing" Jesus, but, if Jesus was not a forgiving, loving, compassionate, and "God-intoxicated" person, then what was he?
Would an identification spirituality explanation of how Jesus and God were "one" appeal to Christians, Muslims, Jews, and Unitarians? This is an open question. All must answer for themselves. The Jewish Scriptures preceded Jesus, so they say nothing about him. The Qur'ān, which came much later, does speak of Jesus in-what seems to Christians-both positive and negative terms. Some of these negatives are based largely on taking such words as "Son" and "Father" much too literally, too crudely, too pseudobiologically. As Volf successfully explained, Christians do not do this. Even for Christians, "Father" and "Son" are metaphorical words. 65 Not even Christian fundamentalists are quite that literal-minded. Christians may have other problems, beyond the scope of this discussion, with the Qur'ān's portrait of Jesus. Differences among Christians, Muslims, Jews, and other monotheists will always remain, even after they agree on One God of Love and the necessity for loving one another. Yet, perhaps all could relate lovingly, peacefully, and respectfully in a common world for the common good. Perhaps all could resolve to live and let live, think and let think, and agree to disagree on many issues, just as most Christians agree to disagree with other Christians, most Muslims with other Muslims, and most Jews with other Jews. Perhaps all could live in profound love, fellowship, respect, justice, repentance, forgiveness, and peace with one another and with all others. On that day, God's realm will have come.
Finally, some very important questions remain for interfaith dialogue. Is the sort of abundant living, identification spirituality, and loving union or identification with one God and with one another outlined here a good thing, a desirable thing? Would our lives be richer or poorer for it? If so, why do we not do it? How can we learn to do it? Do or should monotheists have this much in common? Are counterparts to identification spirituality present in faiths other than Christianity? Christian and non-Christian monotheists must answer for themselves.
